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Evolution to Autonomy
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AbstrAct: Evolutionary theory and much of modern moral theory grew up in the shadows 
of newton and Hume. unlike 20th century physics, which devised new metaphysical concepts 
to accommodate revolutionary ideas, many biologists’ understanding of evolutionary causation 
and evolutionary ethics remains confounded by the earlier metaphysics. Recently, Humean 
skepticism and mechanistic selectionism have coincided in postmodern attacks on essentialism, 
on meta-narratives of progress, on models of human nature, and on collective morality. Against 
this new wave of foundational skepticism, contemporary complex systems science suggests useful 
alternatives for evolutionary causation, the biology of human nature, and their implications for 
ethics.
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A.  is EvolutionARy EtHiCs Evolving oR going ExtinCt?
Evolutionary theory has transformed not only biology, but much of modern sci-
ence including anthropology, psychology, and economics. But while evolution has given 
natural science an impressive coherence, it seems to have raised more questions for 
metaphysics and ethics than it has solved. turning from theory to practice, philosophers 
have scrutinized evolution for new answers to old questions about moral foundations. 
But it is not yet clear what evolution can tell us about how we should live. 
traditional societies typically turned to nature not only for knowledge of what is, 
but also for knowledge of what ought to be.1 Western philosophers from the stoics to the 
democratic revolutions appealed to natural law for ethical principles. But modern phys-
ics, architect of the modern view of nature, found its natural laws indifferent to morality. 
since The Origin of  Species scientists and philosophers have debated whether evolution 
would remoralize natural law or drain the last drop of blood from its corpse. indeed, sci-
entists and philosophers have not only offered diametrically opposed views of evolution’s 
moral agenda, some have doubted whether evolution has any moral meaning at all. At 
one moral pole are the social Darwinians who argue not only that the fittest survive at 
the expense of the weak, but that they ought to survive at the expense of the weak. At the 
other moral pole are the idealists who find cooperation and cosmic love at the end of 
evolution (e.g., C. s. Peirce, lester Ward, John Fiske, Peter Kropotkin, John Dewey, Ju-
     1. All traditional cultures, as David Bidney has noted, try to legitimate their moralities in terms of natural 
law. Theoretical Anthropology, new york: Columbia university Press, 1953.
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lian Huxley, teilhard de Chardin). then there are post-supernaturalists like sartre who 
find no guidance in nature absent god’s commands: “Everything is indeed permitted if 
god does not exist” for if god does not exist we are not “provided with any values or 
commands that could legitimize our behavior.”2 For 150 years now evolutionary ethics 
has wavered between realism, idealism and nihilism.
given the lack progress in evolutionary ethics, some have despaired of its prospects. 
Having chronicled a history of “the temptations of evolutionary ethics,” Paul lawrence 
Farber finds only frustration: “the fundamental problems dogging earlier attempts re-
main unresolved: the oversimplification of the conception of ethics; the lack of an inde-
pendent justification for values; the lack of a rational justification of one’s obligation to 
comply with those values; and the enormous gulf between actions that promote survival 
and actions that are deemed moral.”3 Farber draws three lessons from this theoretical 
failure.
First, evolution exerts a powerful attraction over ethical thought despite its •	
critical problems; furthermore, evolutionary theory has shown a powerful 
ability to colonize new areas of thought. given this influence, the attraction 
of drawing further implications is not likely to disappear. 
second, reducing moral impulses to biological causes would not decide mor-•	
al questions. Biology may explain the origins of acquisitive and religious im-
pulses, but those origins do not decide how we ought to reconcile them. 
third, even if we could glean the general direction of human evolution, it •	
would be too vague to be useful: “Philosophers have repeatedly pointed out 
that as a guide, evolutionary considerations are too broad to be of value. 
similarly, as a foundation, they either beg the question or are so general as 
to be meaningless.” 
these points appear to confirm two well-known objections to the derivation of eth-
ics from science: the genetic fallacy and the fact/value distinction. the first says that the 
causal origins of something do not necessarily define its ideal end; the second says that 
the facts of human nature do not automatically decide the priorities of human nature 
for particular actions.
Farber’s pessimism is not contradicted by a discernible consensus on the moral 
meaning of evolution. the fact/value gap first asserted by Hume is still widely accepted 
and none of the standard approaches to evolutionary ethics enjoys a consensus on how 
to bridge it. How permanent is this quandary? Quine has said that the Humean con-
dition is the human condition. But Hume’s skepticism about natural foundations for 
morality is only as authoritative as the metaphysics that gave rise to that skepticism in 
the first place, which happens to be newton’s metaphysics.4 to wake philosophy from 
     2. sartre, Jean Paul, (1961), “Existentialism and Humanism,” French Philosophers from Descartes to Sartre, ed. 
leonard m. marsak, new york: meridian.
     3. The Temptations of  Evolutionary Ethics, Berkeley, California, 1998.
     4. Hume urged “the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects” (xvi), by which he meant 
applying the newtonian conception of science to ethics (and everything else). the hand of newton is clearly 
seen when Hume insists that “all causes are of the same kind,” i.e., mechanistic causes (p. 171). A Treatise of  
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its dogmatic slumbers, Hume fashioned his philosophy according to newtonian em-
piricism, a view of science which subsequent developments in physics and biology have 
shown to be inadequate. But where theories of relativity, quantum indeterminacy and 
complex systems have revolutionized basic physical concepts, evolutionary theory and 
its ethics have remained mired in newton. naturally, no progress could be expected for 
evolutionary ethics until evolutionary theory accommodates the new science of com-
plexity. given the entrenchment of the newtonian-Humean assumptions, however, a 
critique of the received legacy is in order.
B.  nEWtoniAn Evolution: nECEssity AnD CHAnCE
From the 18th century to the middle of the 19th, science was newtonian science, 
causation was mechanistic causation, and explanation was analysis into particles and 
their forces. Kant believed that the newtonian concepts of space and time were apriori 
true, the necessary conditions of empirical understanding. no wonder that Hume and 
Darwin began from newtonian concepts. Although Darwin began to break from the 
atomistic version of mechanistic causation with his analysis of populations, the more 
reductive versions of Darwinism have remained loyal to the newtonian ideal of analysis 
into the causal effects of lowest level parts.5 According to this view, causal (i.e., scientific) 
explanation only goes in one direction: from lower level parts to higher level wholes. 
Complex systems are nothing but aggregations of lower level physical effects. 
For evolutionary theory, the newtonian principle set some narrow conceptual lim-
its: 
Evolution is explained by either necessity or chance1. . newtonian causal explanation 
involves subsuming individual events under mechanical laws of motion. 
Causal influences that are not law-like are credited to chance. the necessity-
or-chance view of evolution was preferred for two reasons. First, the aspect of 
law-like necessity complied with the traditional understanding of causation as 
a necessary relation between cause and effect. And second, the mechanistic 
model brought the precision and clarity of the modern experimental method 
to evolutionary theory (e.g., yielding the achievements of genetics and mo-
lecular biology).6 As epitomized in monod’s Chance and Necessity, the statistical 
patterns that shape morphology are supposed to be reducible to invariances 
as the ultimate form of scientific explanation.7
Human Nature, oxford, 1888.
     5. Perhaps the most wide-ranging and explicit contemporary linkage between reductionism, science, and 
natural selection can be found in E. o. Wilson’s Consilience: The Unity of  Knowledge, new york, Random 
House, 1998: e.g., reductionism is “the primary and essential activity of science” (54). 
     6. Darwin began to move toward population thinking rather than strict reduction to parts, in which case 
many of the cumulative effects of mechanistic action in biology could only be formulated in statistical terms. 
But the underlying genetic causes of evolutionary change and the force of selection were assumed to be 
mechanistic. Cf. mayr, Ernst, Evolution and the Diversity of  Life: Selected Essay,. Cambridge: Harvard university 
Press, 1976;  p. 26 ff.
     7. monod, Jacques, Chance and Necessity, new york, Random House, 1972. monod explicitly refers to invari-
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Mechanistic explanation renders final causal explanations superfluous or false.2.  the di-
chotomy of necessity and chance rules out final causal explanations insofar as 
final causation is not law-like but probabilistic. moreover, teleological expla-
nations suffered several other liabilities: they seemed redundant if mechani-
cal causes were already accounted for; teleological explanations recalled the 
theological explanations of medievalism; teleological explanations did not 
allow for quantification. the triumph of the mechanistic model eventually 
rendered interpretations of teleology virtually non-sensical (e.g., “backward 
causation”).8
Without natural ends, ethics is adrift.3.  Adopting newton’s concepts, Hume correlat-
ed feelings and passion to physical forces rather than to final causes (reasons) 
as Aristotle had.9  this separation of reasons from desires rendered motiva-
tion as blind as physical forces. not surprisingly, Hume found in the moral 
world the sort of accidental contingency that newtonians find in his world of 
necessity and chance.
in the 19th and 20th centuries, Hume’s fact/value distinction was taken up by positiv-
ism’s ideal of a value-neutral science, widely discouraging evolutionary ethics. moreo-
ver, to positivism’s value-neutral science neo-Darwinism added its many-trends argu-
ment against evolutionary progress. seeing that evolutionary diversification constitutes 
no single trend, evolutionists concluded that evolution has no single telos, and therefore 
no single criterion of progress. Evolution, many concluded, is as indifferent to life’s ends 
as are the laws of newton.
After the decline of positivism at mid-20th century, postmodern skepticism about 
meta-narratives of progress echoed biological anti-finalism at the level of cultural histo-
ry.10 to the Darwinian arguments against evolutionary progress, postmoderns added the 
historical contingency of human moralities. Just as evolution spawns many trends and 
ance as the foundation of scientific explanation.
     8. Remarkably, monod dogmatically adheres to the newtonian causal priorities while recognizing the 
emergence of final causation in evolution. thus he observes: “the cornerstone of the scientific method is the 
postulate that nature is objective. in other words, the systematic denial that true knowledge can be got at by 
interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes -- that is to say, of ‘purpose’… [t]he postulate of objectivity 
is consubstantial with science…objectivity nevertheless obliges us to recognize the teleonomic character of 
living organisms, to admit that in their structure and performance they act projectively -- realize and pursue 
a purpose. Here therefore, at least in appearance, lies a profound epistemological contradiction” (Ibid., 21, 
22). the contradiction arises insofar as monod’s model of causation and explanation insists both (a) on 
reducing nature to simple parts and (b) on recognizing the emergence of complex, systemic causes.
     9. Having equated passions with forces, Hume could not allow that reason had “originary power” in the 
shaping of the mind. Reason could only guide the force of passion, not fundamentally transform it. thus 
reason could not be a cause in the newtonian sense of force. 
     10. the postmodern rejection of “metanarratives” of progress received considerable recognition through 
Jean-Francois lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, minneapolis, minnesota, 1984. since 
then the work of michel Foucault has garnered support for postmodern localism, the view that emancipatory 
politics should avoid general, and a fortiori universal, claims: michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge : Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977,  new york, Pantheon, 1980.
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therefore does not reveal a preferred outcome, cultures too differ so fundamentally that 
meta-ethics cannot discover a transcendent criterion of right action. in the absence of a 
natural standard by which to distinguish moral and immoral actions, the indeterminacies 
of evolution and the accidents of history render human nature morally indeterminate. 
the influence of newton in biology has never gone uncontested. For several genera-
tions, for instance, Ernst mayr has warned against importing reductive and physicalistic 
assumptions into biology. in fact, his work on final causation is an effective cure for 
newtonian inertia.
C.  FinAlity in EvolutionARy DEvEloPmEnt
the inadequacy of newtonian metaphysics is nowhere clearer than in the necessity-
or-chance model of causal explanation. the goods of human nature (e.g., sociability, 
learning) were not brought about by necessity (since evolution might have gone dif-
ferently) nor by mere chance (since antecedent events predetermined that sociability 
and learning would be adaptive). in general, adaptiveness can only be accounted for in 
probabilistic terms. Evolution is opportunistically attracted to more adaptive structures, 
functions, and behaviors, which is to say that changes along adaptive lines are more 
likely to survive and flourish than changes in non-adaptive directions. to say that adap-
tive traits are attractors for evolutionary change is to say that they describe the likely 
directions of evolutionary change. 
this simple idea contradicts not only the necessity/chance dichotomy, but also the 
mechanist’s blind-or-intentional view of final causation. laws of force are necessary but 
morally blind. Human actions show foresight, but nothing else in nature enjoys that tele-
ological look-ahead. organic functions, therefore, seemed to occupy a no-man’s-land 
between blind force and conscious purpose. Even more perplexing is how something 
in the future—an adaptive attractor—could influence something in the present (a feat 
which seems to require “backwards causation”). What that view failed to see was that 
systemic attractors, in incipient forms, are already shaping organic development through 
the organism’s current self-organizing powers. Evolutionary attractors are not reaching 
back from the future to the present; rather, they point to where the organism’s current 
self-adaptive capabilities will likely develop according to what circumstances are likely 
to permit. 
the operation of organic functions and evolutionary attractors involves a finality 
that lies between mechanistic necessity and teleological design. Following Colin Pit-
tendrigh’s notion of teleonomic functions, Ernst mayr has usefully distinguished three 
levels of final causation: blind physical forces (teleomaty), functional self-organization 
(teleonomy), and conscious purposes (teleology).11 in the inanimate realm, mayr noted, 
natural laws describe changes or movements directed toward some “end state,” whether 
that be a rock falling to the bottom of a well or a hot poker cooling to room temperature. 
“they are ‘end-directed’ only in a passive, automatic way, regulated by external forces 
     11. mayr, Ibid., 383 ff.
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or conditions,” i.e., rather than by internal mechanisms, and they cease to change when 
their physical potential is used up.12  He called such changes teleomatic.
As used in its Aristotelian-medieval heritage, the term teleology covered all forms of 
goal-directed change from the natural to the supernatural. But modern biology requires 
that organic and intentional forms of goal-direction be distinguished. mayr assigns tele-
onomic and teleological functions respectively to the terms of that distinction.13 
teleonomic processes are everywhere in biology: “for instance, most activity con-
nected with migration, food getting, courtship, ontogeny, and all phases of reproduction 
is characterized by such goal orientation. the occurrence of goal-directed processes is 
perhaps the most characteristic feature of the world of living organisms.”14 Where does 
the control of this goal-directed process come from? mayr attributes it to a “program,” 
which he defines as “coded or prearranged information that controls a process (or be-
havior) leading it toward a given end.”15 
significantly for ethics, the teleonomic/teleological distinction largely coincides 
with the criterion by which we determine whether or not actors are responsible. As the 
law tells us, without awareness of the consequences of one’s choices, moral responsibility 
is impossible. A body’s metabolic efficiency may be a good thing (healthy) and its meta-
bolic participation in the production of cancer cells may be a bad thing (unhealthy), but 
neither is a matter of moral responsibility. similarly, the instinctive behavior of animals 
does not (in most cases at least) rise to the level of moral choice. thus we acknowledge 
a difference in kind between actions that are automatic and those that are (or should be) 
the result of intentional choice. 
Due to the anti-teleological thrust of early modern physics, biologists have struggled 
with the dilemma that the language of ends and purposes seems appropriate for biologi-
cal functionality thought final causation was not supposed to exist. But if one subtracts 
the element of intentionality from ends, it is safe to say that species evolved with organs 
and instincts suited to specific ends. in that case, the telos of each species (in the tele-
onomic, not teleological sense) is the realization of whatever suite of adaptive capacities 
it has inherited. 
this evolution from blind responsiveness to ends-orientation is not a threshold but 
a scale (albeit with large punctuations) that ranges from a wholly retrospective determi-
nacy (mechanistic causation) to prospective determinacy (conscious orientation toward 
future interests). Regarding adaptation, the more adequately an organism can achieve 
look-ahead, the more it can control its fate. Even critics of evolutionary teleology such 
     12. Ibid., 389.
     13. “We can summarize this discussion by stating that there is not conflict between causality and teleonomy, 
but that scientific biology has not found any evidence that would support teleology in the sense of various 
vitalistic or finalistic theories…” Ibid., 366.
     14. Ibid., 389.
     15. Ibid., 393-4. unfortunately, the notion of such a program leads to issues about the location of the 
information that gets carried out by ontogenic development (is it in the genotype, the phenotype, or 
the ecosystem?). For our purposes, however, we need only acknowledge that organisms have evolved 
spontaneous functions that can be distinguished from blind forces and conscious purposes.
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as monod have observed this: “obviously, the part played by teleonomic performances 
in the orientation of selection becomes greater and greater, the higher the level of or-
ganization and hence, autonomy of the organism with respect to its environment—to the 
point where teleonomic performance may indeed be considered decisive in the higher 
organisms, whose survival and reproduction depend above all on their behavior” (ibid., 
126). As evolution develops away from external mechanistic determinacy to increasingly 
prospective goal-oriented responses, so organic functionality becomes capable of auton-
omously increasing its adaptiveness. likewise, the more prospective organic functions 
become, the more their causal explanations must accommodate prospective benefits. 
this trend constitutes the evolution of  autonomy, the emergence of adaptive freedom. 
the more alternative responses are available to an actor, the more free the choice of 
action, the wider the range of adaptive possibilities. in that case, freedom is not an all 
or nothing affair, but something that can be more or less optimized. to acknowledge 
the evolution of autonomy within the diverse trends of evolution is to acknowledge that 
physical determinacy and teleology are not mutually exclusive ways of interpreting na-
ture but are instead two ends of a scale of natural causes that reaches from the blind 
mechanisms of physics, through the self-preserving behaviors of organisms, to the pro-
spective intentionality of human choices. 
By the standard of adaptability-as-freedom, human thought is the most adaptive de-
velopment in natural history. Conversely, insofar as rational, strategic, autonomous, and 
inventive action has “attracted” our evolution, this sort of resourcefulness is the telos of 
our nature from the evolutionary point of view. to say what Rousseau should have said, 
we could say that humans were born to be free (i.e., to become rationally autonomous). 
in that case, the extremes of biological determinacy and radical ethical relativism both 
mislead regarding our evolutionary legacy. 
Against ultra-relativism:•	  if autonomy explains the adaptiveness of human nature, 
then it is the natural and universal ideal of human development notwith-
standing the diversity of personalities. However different more personal ends 
ought to be, the ability of individuals to choose the best means to their per-
sonal ends depends in each case on the capacity for autonomy. neither the 
moral blindness of physics nor the diversity of evolutionary trends blunts the 
moral thrust of this ideal: whatever interferes with individual development 
toward autonomy blocks the evolutionary trajectory of human nature.
Against strong determinism•	 : Determinists typically identify some behavioral or 
dispositional features of human nature as determined by natural selection. 
the identification of particular types, however, is rendered specious inso-
far as human personalities are individualized by quite different needs and 
strengths. By contrast, the ideal of autonomy does not specify particular 
traits; it is about the ability to cultivate one’s own traits. it is the capacity that 
allows one to find his or her optimized adaptation. 
thus human nature’s telos of autonomy does not resemble the more specialized 
adaptations of other species. ours requires that we reconcile our special determinacy 
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and our enabling indeterminacy. this via media cuts a path between the two extremes 
bequeathed by the newtonian-Humean legacy: determinism (found in sociobiological 
particularism) and radical moral relativism (found in postmodern localism). Recogniz-
ing freedom as the natural goal of humanity requires that we account both for the de-
terminacy of its enabling conditions and the flexibility required to allow individuals to 
become autonomous. 
in retrospect, various evolutionary debates were misled by the urge to decide wheth-
er evolution is either directed or blind, and human nature either predetermined toward 
a single form or indifferent to diverse behaviors. But the unique telos of human nature 
not only reconciles determinacy and freedom, it requires both in equal measure.
Looking backwards—the paradox of  the biological determinacy of  freedom:  Human freedom 
hides a determinacy that was long in the making. Ethical autonomy only became pos-
sible due to a host of biological determinations that coincided in human nature. 
on the one hand, human anatomy and development must take specific forms in or-
der to yield freedom of thought and action. Jos verhulst has charted the range of distinct 
physiological features that support the unique, high level cerebral functions of the hu-
man mind. let us assume that language and tool-use are the two dominant behavioral 
features of human autonomy. Working backwards toward the body, these depend on a 
laterally oriented arm with a long reach, the prehensile hand, a broad sacram and sacral 
angle, upright walking, liberated breathing, and a longer learning period. Even more 
specifically, these features depend on a host of others: fetalized pattern of arterial rami-
fication, broad thorax, retention of the five-rayed hand, retention of thick-vertebrae, 
long lower limbs, no infracardiac lobe, retention of cranial flexure and central position 
of the foramen magnum, retention of the fetal foot form, large forebrain, protracted 
childhood, retention of a longer neck, deep location of the larynx, retention of the flat 
facial skull, retention of dimensions of first dentition, etc. Human freedom is enabled by 
having all these physical determinations rather than others. 
on the other hand, the freedom made possible by these determinations brings with 
it the unique degree of behavioral indeterminacy and cognitive plasticity that allow self-
determination to arise gradually. the frequency of the word “retention” here indicates 
that these features depend on human ontogenesis not specializing in the way that other 
higher mammals specialize. true, contrary to the blank slate idea the human mind 
must contain instincts for extensive language learning as well as for survival. But though 
not a wholly blank slate, the human mind needs at least some blank spaces to write on. 
Human ontogenesis, in other words, must retain a developmental flexibility that is char-
acteristic of an earlier stage of ontogenesis, though this retained flexibility still requires 
the physical resources of a highly evolved mammal. 
in short, we must be specifically determined to be free: determinacy and indetermi-
nacy must coincide in the just the right way to allow for human freedom. individual au-
tonomy depends on both the biological determinacy of human nature and on the cogni-
tive indeterminacy that allows individuals to learn an enormous variety of responses and 
begin to invent themselves in order to realize their own best interests. 
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Looking forwards -- the attractor of  autonomy:  Human nature’s paradoxical blend of de-
terminacy and indeterminacy finds its evolutionary counterpart in the paradox that 
freedom is a quasi-specific attractor of human development, and therefore a curious 
sort of cause. Biologists acknowledge a more general version of this principle by saying 
that sometimes adaptiveness is better served by remaining generally adaptive rather 
than specifically adaptive. Whereas specialization may confer short term advantages in 
competition with those less evolved for specific functions, environmental pressures may 
shift in ways that the more specialized actors cannot adapt to. By withholding special-
ized forms of adaptation, human evolution is simply the farthest evolutionary advance 
along that line of generalized adaptiveness. 
given these considerations, it is easy to misconceive what the human telos must be 
like. underestimating the open-endedness of human nature leads to over-particularizing 
the goal of human evolution as a particular end state or personality profile. underesti-
mating the determinacy of human nature leads to the opposite error of positing a blank 
slate view of the mind or of denying of human nature at all. the former error is typi-
fied by Darwinians who identify human adaptiveness with competitive instincts, either 
because they conflate social and natural evolution (social Darwinism) or because they 
take “arms races” to be the epitome of evolutionary progress. the latter error is typified 
by those who assume that human diversity and freedom are incompatible with having a 
biologically determined nature. But both errors are simply versions of the old necessity/
chance dichotomy that is as inappropriate on the issue of human nature as it is in matters 
of evolutionary causation.
For evolutionary ethics, there are two keys to the complex systems view of human 
nature:
species are shaped primarily by their phenotype’s self-organizing powers for 1. 
adaptive change. their natural “end” in any given generation is (a) to real-
ize the adaptive powers they have inherited from their ancestors and (b) to improve 
upon those inherited capabilities if possible.
Rational self-determination is the current end of  human nature2. . Put in more standard 
biological terms, this means that the adaptive value of rational self-determi-
nation (both individual and collective) explains both the evolved form of hu-
man nature (e.g., the large brain) and human nature’s remarkable success at 
accommodating the environment to its needs (e.g., strategic thinking). 
As familiar as these points may seem, their implications for evolutionary causa-
tion and human nature have not been realized as they do not fit the false dichotomy 
of overdetermined vs. underdetermined models of human nature. to move forward in 
evolutionary ethics we must show how the telos individual autonomy defines an ideal 
more general than a particularized personality type though more substantial than ethi-
cal relativism. 
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D. FREEDom As An EvolutionARy AttRACtoR
Echoing the metaphysics of necessity-or-chance, post-newtonian concepts of hu-
man nature have tended toward determinacy or freedom, but not their proper balance. 
Both extremes are off target: morality lies in the gray area in between, i.e., in the land-
scape of possibilities and probabilities. the moral world begins with the imagination of 
those possibilities and probabilities.
though other animals may have incipient intelligence and culture, human culture’s 
difference of degree becomes a difference of kind with the emergence of teleology (de-
liberate intention) from teleonomy (instinct). in human culture becomes fully intentional 
in both senses: words are symbols of  something else (they refer semantically), but culture 
both requires and fosters deliberation over alternative possible actions. the two forms 
of intentionality coincide in the development of interior “lifeworlds,” mental landscapes 
in which persons imagine possible futures. this ability is a precondition of our adap-
tive resourcefulness. Where instincts are useful for specialized, predictable responses, 
deliberation and imagination allow for ad hoc adaptation. Where other animals are 
predetermined for specialized behaviors, persons may choose to seek or invent alterna-
tive ends, use this or that tool, follow or not follow their instincts, follow or not follow 
the group. true, the potential for autonomy is not equally realized in all individuals. yet 
the potential for responsibility is built into our social instincts; it is presupposed by all 
social systems of reward and punishment. A sense of responsibility is a species-wide trait, 
which is what we would expect given its adaptive value.16 
thus biology and ethics meet in the imagination of intentional action. these evolu-
tionary developments imply a metaphysics of possible well-being that disarms numerous 
old antagonists.
1.  Determinism vs. Free Will
though the ancients recognized a problem of free will, the problem of free will has 
proven especially confounding for modern mechanistic philosophy’s scheme of necessity 
and chance. traditional philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle took free will to mean 
an action whose causes were deliberately chosen by the actor. our wills are free to the 
extent that our choices are not blocked by circumstance. Freedom is a matter of degree: 
our range of freedom is measured by our range of choices. 
in the modern period mechanists from Hobbes to skinner found free will incompat-
ible with the clockwork world, and therefore challenged free choice in principle. they 
reasoned:
to be determined is to be caused. to be caused to do something is not to be free to 
do otherwise. if all events are caused, no events are free. if choices are events, no 
choice is free. Whenever i choose to do something, i am caused to do it by having 
a greater desire to do that rather than doing something else or doing nothing. i 
may think i have free will, but that is only because i have not yet recognized that 
     16. sociopaths are the exceptions that prove the rule.
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my act is caused (as Hobbes put it) by the strongest desire just before acting. 
in the Hobbesean-Humean vein, B. F. skinner’s critique of freedom observes: “two 
features of autonomous man are particularly troublesome. in the traditional view, a 
person is free. He is autonomous in the sense that his behavior is uncaused.”17 But skin-
ner misunderstood the classical notion of free will. on the classical view, a free will does 
not mean an uncaused will, but a will that chooses its causes in light of best consequences 
and reasons. A free will, in other words, is just the product of self-conscious, strategic 
deliberations in which impulses are prudently subordinated to knowledge of our best 
interests.18 in the classical view, a choice can be both caused and free. For mechanistic 
metaphysics, necessity and freedom are mutually exclusive properties.
yet despite the strictest physical determinacy, the future is open to choice. Future 
causes are what we choose (or at least try to choose). until a choice is made, the out-
come of deliberation is open to further deliberation. At the point of choice deliberation 
becomes self-determined. until then, however, the future is open. Parents may discover 
this openness to choice when they attempt to deter a willful child from incorrect be-
havior—say, cursing—through threats of punishment. if the child is willful enough, he 
may respond by cursing just to assert his freedom, just to prove his will is indomitable. 
the action may seem irrational and the child may seem to be “determined” by his 
willfulness. He may even be cutting off his nose to spite his face. But since determinacy 
underlies even free choices, the determinacy of his willfulness is beside the point of the 
openness of the future to choice. the willful act shows that the child knows he can ex-
ercise his freedom to choose his actions, even at his own expense. He is simply willing 
to pay a high price for the freedom to resist. He may not be “free” in the ideally ethical 
sense, but his action is nothing if not intentionally calculated to be his choice. in that 
sense, the parent is reminded to her dismay that the future is open to choice despite her 
rational regime of incentives. 
Evolution supports the classic view by showing how, far from being the enemy of 
freedom, the determinacy of human evolution provides its foundation. the possibility 
of autonomy had to be predetermined by evolution: (1) the origins of life as organic 
systems evolved mechanisms for self-maintenance against the variety of environmental 
pressures; (2) evolution from rudimentary sensitivity to animal perception introduced 
more information about the environment into organisms; (3) as internalized informa-
tion became a more detailed representation of the environment, animals could do more 
to control their environments; (4) ultimately, as the human imagination became able 
to consider alternative futures, thought could choose between possible courses of ac-
tion, increasing control over both the environment and oneself. As self-control became 
imaginative creativity, possible adaptations were multiplied, and adaptation could be 
optimized.
     17. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, new york, Random House, 1971, 17.
     18. this would apply as well to non-consequentialist theories of right action. Whether the reasons are 
consequences or something else (e.g., categorical duties), the point of freedom is that reasons are consciously 
chosen. thus Kant defines autonomy in terms of the choice of action as determined by the right principle.
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the evolution of autonomy is not the abrogation of determinacy, but its transfor-
mation into the possibility of being caused by reasons as well as by forces. Determinacy 
becomes prospective. By enabling the imagination of different possible consequences 
of action, the evolution of autonomy allows human minds to participate consciously 
and intentionally in their determinacy. then determinacy becomes self-determination. 
the possibility of self-determination is why, although we may excuse people for being 
temporarily deprived of their wits (e.g., intoxicated), we hold them responsible in the 
long run for avoiding situations where they are deprived of their wits. those parts of 
ourselves that we could control in the past we may control in the future because our 
choices determine who we become—wittingly or not. Rather than denying determi-
nacy, freedom exploits it.19
2. Individualism vs. Collectivism
Presuming determinacy, most evolutionists have left the problem of free will to met-
aphysicians. more troubling has been the primary locus of evolutionary causation. the 
standard alternatives are: the individual organism, the group (deme or species), and 
most recently, the gene. these debates about levels and units of selection are a version of 
the old metaphysical debate about the priority of parts and wholes in scientific explana-
tion. in early modern science, newtonian physics and atomism in chemistry combined 
to form a mechanistic ideal of selection in which composites are explained as aggrega-
tions of lower level particles. Working out of the age of newton before the discovery of 
genes, it is not surprising that Darwin inclined toward organic individualism. yet he 
also considered group selection as an explanation of altruism. some later Darwinians, 
however, have been more programmatically reductive, sometimes resisting appeals to 
group selection, and even pushing the unit of evolution down to the gene. 
these concerns about levels of selection echo comparable issues in meta-ethics 
about the relationship between individuals and their societies. the ancients generally 
oriented ethics toward the common good while modern rights theories are more careful 
to protect individuals from excessive subordination to group interests. Does evolution 
speak to this issue? if human nature has an end, does it shed light the proper relationship 
between individual and group? Are people merely organs for the social whole (organi-
cism)? or is society just a platform for people to realize themselves (individualism)? if 
autonomy is an evolutionary telos, is autonomy more fully achieved by persons or socie-
ties? 
For the purpose of properly situating individuals and groups in the evolutionary 
scheme, distinctions between force, agency, and autonomy are needed. let us assume 
that agency is the state of having the power to bring something about. in that case, force 
and autonomy are kinds of agency, force being the most blind, and autonomy being 
the most foresighted. likewise, our distinctions between teleomaty (forces), teleonomy 
     19. As Hume noted, strategic choices—including the management of our own passions—would not be 
possible if we could not predict the effects of determinacy.
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(functions), and teleology (intentionality) show that an adequate account of the evolution 












these distinctions explain key inadequacies in the newtonian-Humean legacy: its 
mono-causal model of explanation tends to confuse force and agency where they need 
to be distinguished. 
For instance, some versions of genic selectionism have ascribed the agency of evolu-
tion to gene-maximizing, as if genes were involved in some self-interested competition 
for the most offspring.20 But self-interested agency assumes a goal, and molecules do not 
have goals. goals only arise when dynamic systems are sufficiently organized to orient 
themselves teleonomically. on the other hand, self-interest actually is a motive of indi-
vidual organisms. that goal may require a certain set of genes, and it may depend on 
the adaptive advantages of cooperation with a group, but it is a real orientation of the 
organism as an integral system. 
this distinction can also be made in terms of direction of causation. According to 
the newtonian force-only model of causation, causes (forces and their effects) only aggre-
gate upwards to collective wholes. But where teleonomy is found in complex systems, 
new causal properties emerge: systems direct lower-level events from a higher level of 
coordination. teleomatic forces aggregate upwards; teleonomic agency directs downwards. 
But then agendas can only be imposed from above: something at a lower level can be 
used for higher level functions; but higher level functions cannot be for the functionless 
parts. so we should say, not that organisms serve the (non-existent) agendas of genes, 
but that genes come to serve the evolutionary agendas of organisms. 
it is this deference to higher level, holistic agendas that gave rise to the organicist 
view of society: just as genes serve organisms, so persons serve societies. Could it be that 
while persons are not robots for gene maximization, they really are supposed to be cogs 
in the machinery of society, and that complex societies are the real goal of evolution? 
some have thought so. if—from the teleonomic perspective—it is evident that genes do 
not have agendas, it is not so obvious that societies do not have agendas through which 
nature’s goals might be most fulfilled. societies certainly do have functions that people 
can serve. Perhaps individual autonomy is merely a requisite element in the evolution 
of the society that perfects itself. it is not impossible to interpret some of the biological 
evidence for human autonomy in favor of the social subordination of the individual. 
     20. Proponents of these locutions admit that they are heuristic, as-if  expressions that are only literally true 
in the results they predict. But if they mislead as to where the agency lies, the cost may be more than the 
benefit.
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the long learning period of human development is an index of individuals’ dependence 
on the collective wisdom of the group. the degree to which mob psychology and au-
thoritarian propaganda can dominate an individual’s sense of self-interest suggests that 
people often do act like cogs in a social machine. Perhaps the ultimate goal of human 
development is to blend seamlessly into the ultimate group.21
to the contrary, however, neither human physiology nor human psychology fits 
the model of total subordination to society. true, human psychology sufficiently lacks 
instincts to require socialization. But the comparison with insects shows why humans 
cannot be assimilated to that more instinctive model. What insect societies show is that 
strict subordination of individuals to society is not best accomplished by individuals 
learning social norms, but by inheritance of specialized instincts. the social liabilities 
of learning are obvious: individuals may learn to obey society’s rules, but they may 
refuse to learn, or unlearn later what they learned before. unlike instinctive sociali-
zation, learned socialization includes the freedom to not learn or to unlearn society’s 
rules. instead of elaborate instincts, we have elaborate culture. But intellectual freedom 
is a precondition of cultural evolution. Where genetic change happens spontaneously, 
cultural evolution requires choosing to innovate. if all human behavior were instinctual, 
culture would be unnecessary, and human nature would be as fixed as insect nature. so 
while social organizations depend on at least a minimal degree of obedience, freedom to 
disobey is part of the precondition of human creativity and progress. Cultural progress 
is not instinctively determined, but evolves through a negotiation between past and 
present generations. 
the maturing individual’s ultimate transcendence of mere obedience is confirmed 
by the findings of developmental psychologists. Kohlberg, loevinger, maslow and oth-
ers generally agree that the conventional stage of human socialization—in which the 
young are socialized to identify with social ideals—can and ought finally to be surpassed 
by a stage where individuals are able to judge for themselves whether or not their soci-
ety is living up to its own moral principles, confirming the evolutionary trajectory from 
mere obedience to moral autonomy.
on the other hand, if humans are not born to be cogs in the social machine, perhaps 
they are born to become indifferent to their social origins. the developmental trajec-
tory from obedience to autonomy might suggest that maturity abandons the tutelage of 
collectivism for a radical individualism where persons are “laws unto themselves” (as the 
term “autonomy” might suggest). in that spirit, some radical individualists have claimed 
     21. Earlier generations of anthropologists—including Emile Durkheim and lucien levy-Bruhl—
found in “primitive” societies a powerful collective consciousness of which today’s critics of mass con-
sciousness still find residues. likewise, developmental psychologists such as lawrence Kohlberg have found 
evidence to suggest that the socialization of individuals typically domesticates instinctive self-interest (the 
“preconventional” level of moralization) through identification with society and its values (the “convention-
al” level of moralization). in that case the trajectory of human development might finally be total integra-
tion of the individual ego into the social group-ego just as insects are both physiologically and instinctively 
adapted for total integration into their societies.
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that individuals are born free of any obligations except those they agree to as autono-
mous individuals. But the no-debts view overlooks the biological and social reality upon 
which the emergence of autonomy depends. the social preconditions of autonomy re-
quire a balance of group obligations and individual liberties that do not suggest radi-
cal individualism or radical collectivism. Against radical collectivism, our freedom of 
thought unfits human nature for the blindly cooperative altruism of ant colonies. on the 
other hand, individual excellence depends on the collective resources of society, a point 
often overlooked by radical individualists. As Alasdair macintyre has argued, even if 
we assume the ideal of individual autonomy as our end point, getting there requires a 
collective effort for which the aggregation of voluntary contracts is inadequate.22 it is 
neither factually nor ideally true that individuals are indebted only to those with whom 
they agreed to have dealings.
the hope that evolution will decide whether the individual or society is the telos of 
human nature assumes a false choice. the evolution of autonomy denies both that in-
dividuals are born only to serve society and that individuals inherit no debts to society. 
to overemphasize either collectivity or individuality obscures how the preconditions of 
human nature render human society and individual freedom interdependent. 
3. Competition vs. Cooperation in Human Nature
in the history of Darwinism, the evolutionary roles individuals and societies have 
often been debated in terms of the adaptive value of competition and cooperation. After 
Darwin credited natural selection for adaptive change, some Darwinians concluded 
that competition is responsible for whatever evolutionary progress there is.23 yet the 
evidence of human history—as bloody as it is—does not suggest that human coopera-
tion is secondary to our competitive natures. Early critics of social Darwinism such as 
lester Ward and thorstein veblen showed that cooperation and collective institutions 
are more important for enabling human progress than struggles between individuals.24
Competitive individualism is part of the baggage of newtonian metaphysics, skew-
ing causal explanation toward forceful interactions between lowest level units. But what 
of advantages of cooperation for groups acting as groups? group selection theories at-
tribute some forms of adaptive progress to the advantages of cooperation, i.e., of collec-
tive behavior. those theories claim that adaptiveness is an emergent property of groups, 
so that when groups support each other cooperatively they benefit as a group against 
competing species. Darwinians, to the contrary, have typically explained group traits as 
nothing but aggregations of lower level effects of individuals struggling to survive. Even 
     22. Dependent Rational Animals, notre Dame, 2001.
     23. E.g., Richard Dawkins on arms races: “it is largely arms races that have injected such ‘progressiveness’ 
as there is in evolution…the arms-race idea remains by far the most satisfactory explanation for the 
existence of the advanced and complex machinery that animals and plants possess” (The Blind Watchmaker, 
1988; 178).
     24. lester Frank Ward. “mind as a social Factor,” Mind 4 (october 1884): 563-73; thorstein veblen, The 
Theory of  the Leisure Class, new york: macmillan, 1899.
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when cooperating, individual organisms are the target of selection. According to Dar-
winian individualism, a fleet herd of gazelles is a herd of fleet gazelles: it is not the fleet 
group that selection favors, but fleet individuals that out-compete the less fleet.
Darwin himself did not rule out group selection. He recognized the difficulty the 
individualistic model had explaining altruistic individuals who sacrifice themselves “for 
the sake of the group.” After all, how could individualistic selection select for self-sacri-
ficial altruists when they don’t survive to reproduce? if selection favored self-interested 
individuals only, so group-selectionists protested, there would be no altruistic instincts, 
whereas there are many examples of individual self-sacrifice for the group (e.g., ma-
ternal care, warrior castes, service castes, etc.). thus altruism became the immovable 
object of group selection theories.
so it’s no wonder that reductive individualists hailed the discovery of kin selection 
by Williams and Hamilton in the late 1950s. According to their work, altruistic behav-
ior is not accounted for by the adaptiveness of groups, but rather by selective pressure 
to protect the shared genes of one’s kin. (Here altruism means self-sacrificial behavior, 
not self-sacrificial intentions for moral purposes.) As Williams and Hamilton showed, 
instances of prehuman altruism covary with the percentage of shared genes. Altruistic 
behavior is more likely to occur the more genes the beneficiary of altruism shares with 
the altruist. in that case, despite appearances to the contrary, altruism should be under-
stood as just another way of passing on one’s own genes even though the altruist does not 
reproduce. thus genic selectionists accommodated behavioral altruism to their theory 
that evolution is driven by gene maximization, a contest (at the lowest possible level) in 
which the winners are the genes that proliferate most. Cooperation, though apparently 
non-competitive, is just a disguised form of genetic self-interest. so genic individualism 
need not surrender to group selectionism, and gene competition is not contradicted by 
cooperation at higher levels. 
At best, however, even if instinctual altruism is underlain by shared genes, the gene-
maximizing explanation of altruism only softens the problem of self-sacrifice for the 
group rather than dissolving it entirely. if group selection were true, one would still 
expect that pre-human altruism depends on a shared genetic interest rather than on a 
wholly disinterested self-sacrifice. After all, the kin are the group. Who would expect that 
ants would sacrifice themselves to save grasshoppers? And how would altruists know 
who to save if not by instinctively preferring kin? the sharing of genes does not make 
the case for genetic individualism rather than group selection. group-selectionists can 
simply maintain that kin selection explains the mechanism of group selection at a lower 
level. 
if multiple levels of interaction are at work here (genes, organisms, groups), how 
does one assign agency? For advocates of higher level causes (such as cooperation) caus-
al agency may be discerned through the concept of motivation. is the motive of altruism 
really better explained by genes or by group interests? From the group selectionist per-
spective, it is question-begging to focus on kin selection’s effects of gene-maximization 
rather than on the cooperative behavior that brings it about because the property of  adap-
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tiveness adheres to the cooperative behavior, not to the genes themselves. if organisms are trying to 
adapt, and if cooperative behavior is more adaptive than non-cooperative behavior, it is 
the cooperation that should get the credit for adaptation, not some fictional attribution 
of self-interest to a gene. Assuming the Darwinian end of survival, cooperation is the 
means to that end, and cooperative genes are the means to cooperation. the genes for 
altruism are not the motive of cooperation; they are its means. By contrast, cooperation 
really is a motive of organisms. it is the adaptive advantage of cooperation that explains 
why that behavior occurs, whereas the kin-selection account of genes only explains the 
resulting distribution of genes.25 
of course, the sad truth is that life often feels like a competitive struggle to survive, 
which partly explains the perennial appeal of the competitive view of life to the tough-
minded philosophers of whom William James spoke. nonetheless, it is a conceptual er-
ror to think that natural history shows competition to be more fundamental to evolution 
than cooperation. that should be obvious for all sexually reproducing species: no mat-
ter how tense the war between the sexes, their very existence depends on cooperation. 
What could be more fundamental than that?
more theoretically, it is hard to imagine how the essentially cooperative features 
of human nature such as language and culture could have evolved in a landscape of 
individuals not already disposed to cooperate. Cultural evolution presupposes mutual 
identification and a shared moral sensibility as well as imagination of the future. true, 
it is the aim of socialization to create such mutual identification and shared sensibility, 
in which case cooperation can be credited to nurture as well as to nature. But nurture 
itself would never have arisen if cooperation were not already instinctive. theories that 
try to derive cooperation from competition founder on this point. Hobbes’ social con-
tract theory famously drew the evolution of cooperation out of a society of self-centered 
individuals, a state of nature with its brutish and short-lived war of all against all. the 
hardships of Hobbes’ state of nature are supposed to have motivated our ancestors to 
accept tyrannical rule in the interests of peace. But the possibility of a social contract 
presupposes the very capability for cooperation that a primarily competitive model of 
evolution rules out. if Hobbes were right that instinctively selfish lives in the state of 
nature were nasty, brutish, and short, no one would have had either the time or the 
imagination to negotiate a social contract. the possibility of negotiating presupposes the 
     25. Heuristic counterfactuals are not a monopoly of competitive individualists. When Dewey makes his 
case for the adaptive advantage of cooperation, he hypothesizes some ancestor going through the costs 
and benefits of aiding the weak: “in looking after these helpless we shall develop habits of foresight and 
forethought, power of looking before and after, tendencies to husband our means, which shall ultimately 
make the most skilled in warfare. We shall foster habits of group loyalty, feelings of solidarity, which shall 
bind us together by such close ties that no social group which has not cultivated like feelings through caring 
for all its members, will be able to withstand us.” Dewey himself concludes: “in a word, such conduct 
would pay in the struggle for existence as well as be morally commendable” (“Evolution and Ethics”, The 
Monist, vol. viii, April 1989, no. 3, pp. 321-41; reprinted in nitecki and nitecke (eds.) Evolutionary Ethics, 
Albany, ny: suny Press.1993.) Dewey’s scenario is historical fiction (albeit more realistic than selfish 
genes), although that fiction explains the evolutionary advantage of cooperation. that is, his argument does 
not explain altruistic behavior by showing its motives, but rather by showing its advantageous effects.
Cosmos AnD HistoRy76
very ability to cooperate that Hobbes is supposed to be explaining.
ironically, the articulate individualism celebrated by defenders of competition is 
only possible because people—unlike ants—are not wholly programmed to respond 
thoughtlessly to their behavioral cues. Any species in the thrall of its competitive in-
stincts would never have developed the shared resources required for creative progress. 
But given the ambiguities of human history, evidence of human nature can be selected 
to favor deep assumptions like those of the newtonian-Humean-Hobbesian legacy. Evo-
lutionary metaphysics aside, the evidence of infancy and childhood suggests that hu-
mans have both self-centered and bonding instincts, that both kinds are adaptive, and 
that neither is more fundamental than the other.
4. Past vs. Future
in recent decades the problem of determinacy and freedom has re-emerged with 
debates over sociobiology (1970s) and evolutionary psychology (1990s). Where some sci-
entists have emphasized humanity’s graduation from biological evolution (mediated by 
genes and instincts) to cultural evolution (mediated by culture and reasoning), sociobiol-
ogists and evolutionary psychologists have emphasized the ways in which human nature 
is still biologically determined by its past. two issues coincide here: what can these dis-
ciplines tell us about our past and what are the implications of our past for our future? 
Even with our potential for autonomy, how much are our ethical choices curtailed by 
the biological burdens we have not chosen? 
in the 1970s sociobiology burst onto the scientific scene with some very strong claims 
for itself. in a notorious passage on the impossibility of transcending biological impera-
tives E. o. Wilson claimed:
the genes hold culture on a leash. the leash is very long, but inevitably values will 
be constrained in accordance with their effects on the human gene pool. the brain 
is the product of human evolution. Human behavior—like the deepest capacities 
for emotional response which drive and guide it—is the circuitous technique by 
which human genetic material has been and will be kept intact. morality has no 
other demonstrable ultimate function. (1978, 176)
speaking of constraints, what does this leash metaphor really say? the metaphor 
is too vague to be scientifically precise. Everything depends on just how long the leash 
is. it would be trivially long if it only meant (a) that if people do not reproduce they will 
die out. in that case, the leash only constrains us to reproduce. the leash is a bit shorter 
if it means (b) that instincts will take thousands of years to die out and we will have put 
up with them in the meantime. But even so, merely having instincts does not imply that 
we must be controlled by them. the leash would be shorter than some would allow if 
it means (c) that morality cannot transcend its biological origins to serve other, perhaps 
counter-instinctual motives. Critics would object that this identifies the aim of morality 
with survival.26 How plausible are these leashes? if the genetic leash means only (a), it 
     26. Even that aim is too imprecise. if morality is dedicated to the survival of the genome, does that prompt 
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is trivial, since only science fiction writers imagine worlds without reproduction. if the 
leash means (b), the durability of instincts remains to be seen, especially since it is not yet 
clear what they are. But if the leash means (c), it is clearly false. morality and idealism 
take on lives of their own and need compromise with species-survival only to the trivial 
degree that (a) is true. But (a) hardly requires that morality have no other function than 
the reproduction of genes.
Wilson’s last line reveals the metaphysical agenda of sociobiology as a worldview. to 
begin with, its subordination of human behavior and morality to the agenda of genetic 
reproduction reduces agency to force. genes chemically enable organisms to develop 
themselves as they do. But however necessary to organisms, genes are not agenda-set-
ters; they are agenda enablers. lust is not part of a genetic agenda; nor is morality. 
maximizing genes is no more the function of morality than electron transmission is the 
function of talking on the phone. People talk on the phone for reasons, and electronic 
transmissions are the means for doing so.27 the primary function of morality is to coor-
dinate society. But even the social perspective is too narrow. moral idealism can evolve 
beyond its social function to be defined by personal life-projects.
Wilson’s reference to ultimate functions (cf. Dawkins’ reference to the cosmic util-
ity function of gene maximization)28 substitutes metaphysics for biology. metaphysics 
decides ultimate functions, not biology. the fact that something has adaptive value 
does not mean that its adaptive value is its ultimate function unless one adopts a socio-
biological metaphysics that stipulates that particular priority of functions. Without such 
an assumption Wilson’s claim is contradicted by both nietzsche and traditional religion 
(together for the first time): if nowhere else, nietzsche agrees with traditional religion 
that morality can provide a meaning to life that is superior to survival (the fictions that 
enhance vitality). Who then is to say which function—gene maximization, social har-
monization, or personal meaning—is ultimate and by what standard? 
lowering our sights to biology and its implications for ethics, critics of social Dar-
winism have charged that the distinction between past and future selves gets lost when 
natural historians and sociobiologists reduce human nature to its past and its genetic 
leash. the crudest versions of this error are those that identify human nature with par-
ticular animal prototypes that humans (or some humans at some times) are supposed 
to resemble. Certain traits are singled out as adaptive, e.g., aggressiveness, nurturing, 
ability to deceive, bartering, sexual promiscuity, etc. the less morally edifying portraits 
of human nature have challenged traditional ethics in two ways. 
First, the assumption that we are biologically determined to sin denies the •	
traditional view that we can choose right actions. Where traditional idealists 
enjoined us to follow our angelic nature rather than our animal nature, the 
conservative behaviors that resist change or bold behaviors that maximize gene proliferation?
     27. not even evolution has the agenda of gene maximization; if evolution has a broadest agenda, it is 
diversification. many species adopt survival strategies that have little to do with gene maximization but 
which add to the diversity of life. Cf. H. l. Fairlamb, “nature’s two Ends: the Ambiguity of Progress in 
Evolution,” The Southern Journal of  Philosophy, 1997;35(1):35-55.
     28. Richard Dawkins, River Out of  Eden, 1996.
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more reductive social Darwinians and naked ape theorists argue that the hu-
man nature just is its animal nature. 
second, by attributing human progress to our competitive, even predatory •	
nature, social Darwinians have implied that future progress depends on 
more of the same. 
sociobiology preserved some of the genetic determinism of social Darwinism, but 
focused less on personality types and more on specific behaviors that might have had 
adaptive value. the further transformation of sociobiology into evolutionary psychol-
ogy has mitigated some of sociobiology’s genetic determinism by acknowledging the 
importance of interaction between genes and environment (thus fine-tuning the balance 
of nature and nurture). moreover, the invention of the modularity model of instinctive 
behaviors allows a plurality of evolutionary behaviors to be inherited independently, 
however ethically inconsistent with each other. if certain competitive and cooperative 
reactions were adaptive, we might have evolved instincts for both types of behaviors 
despite the ethical tension between them. With this more fine-grained view of instincts, 
today’s evolutionary psychologists are less likely to reduce human nature to a particular 
profile, or to suggest that human nature reduces to nothing but its instincts for survival. 
Any given “module” is just a fragment in a much larger suite of diverse behaviors. these 
theoretical innovations are consistent with the evolution of autonomy, whose combina-
tion of determinacy and plasticity they help to explain.
Regarding evolutionary ethics, sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists have 
proven more accommodating to idealism than their social Darwinian predecessors. But 
even if we should encourage our ethically ennobled side, they demure, realism requires 
that we recognize what is predetermined (sociably or unsociably) if only to better utilize 
our raw materials. our genetic leash is a natural limit to moral idealism that we must 
take into account. A world of cooperation and civility is better than a world red in tooth 
and claw, and is therefore worth seeking, but our ideals should not blind us to the facts 
of the matter.29
scientists and philosophers should be reluctant to rationalize not looking facts in the 
face.  But even granting the usefulness of facts about our instincts, there are still caveats 
regarding biological determinism. 
First, there remain questions about how much our excavations of the past can dem-
onstrate. Critics of sociobiological hypotheses have charged that speculation about what 
     29. Richard Alexander explains: “it follows that my use of the word biology in no way implies that moral 
systems have some kind of explicit genetic background, are genetically determined, or cannot be altered by 
adjusting the social environment. nor am i about to espouse a social Darwinist view of morality or claim 
that organic evolution offers a means of identifying proper modes of behavior. i mean simply to suggest 
that if we wish to understand those aspects of our behavior commonly regarded as involving morality or 
ethics, it will help to reconsider our behavior as a product of evolution by natural selection. the principal 
reason for this suggestion is that natural selection operates according to general principles which make its 
effects highly predictive, even with respect to traits and circumstances that have not yet been analyzed, or 
perhaps even encountered by scientists” (11-12). The Biology of  Moral Systems, Hawthorne, ny, Aldine, 1987. 
Alexander is right to subsume morality into the realm of evolving systems. But to decide what is “natural” 
one must distinguish cultural teleology from biological teleonomy, which is not easily done.
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our ancestors must have been like has too few controls, and that with the diversity of 
human behavior, one can find putative vestiges of almost any hypothetical ancestor one 
could imagine. given the diversity of human behaviors, testing such speculation would 
require precise analysis of enough data to rule out circumstantial and cultural alterna-
tives to instinctive causes.30 
second, even if one can discover evidence of asocial behavior in the past, there is 
still the inherent danger that by “prudently” accommodating our inner apes we under-
estimate our potential for autonomy. the danger here is not pessimism about human 
nature, but premature pessimism. this danger lurks no matter what the facts of our past 
are. insofar as our evolutionary attractor is for increasing self-determination, and inso-
far as human nature already has considerable adaptive plasticity, past behaviors may 
not predict what can be done under more ideal conditions, especially since conditions 
for self-determination have never been ideal. our past behaviors might have been dif-
ferent had conditions been more edifying. in that case, our past is not a record of what 
human nature was capable of even then, but a record of what it was capable of under 
less than optimal circumstances. the risk is that a premature pessimism based on the past’s 
less than optimal circumstances becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. By setting premature 
limits to sociability, pessimists may foreclose moral improvement before we know what 
our limits really are. 
given human nature’s tendency to become what it imagines, scientists may wonder 
whether it is better to err on the side of optimism or pessimism about human nature. 
History shows what comes from assuming the worst. Even putting aside genocides and 
ethnic cleansing of other cultures, it was anthropological pessimism that led Augustine 
to justify coercion in the name of the one true faith, that led Hobbes to justify tyranny 
in the name of peace, and that led stalin to justify totalitarian rule in the interest of the 
working class. Even if human nature is burdened with inconvenient instincts, the degree 
to which autonomy can be achieved can only be discovered by preparing for the best, 
not by preparing for the worst. 
scientists and philosophers should not object to discovering unpleasant sociobio-
logical truths. nor can they object to publicizing them if  they are true. there may be 
a problem, however, with the methodology of pan-adaptationism, the assumption by 
some determinists that all traits have been selected for their adaptiveness. in one sense, 
of course, all science assumes determinacy in order to discover it. But if sociobiology 
and evolutionary psychology begin by assuming strict adaptive determinacy, they rule 
out apriori human nature’s plasticity and autonomy.31 
Evidence for human autonomy vitiates the pan-adaptationist assumption while 
     30. such studies are not impossible. Cross-cultural studies have shown, for instance, that abuse of children 
by step-parents is 70 to 100 times more likely than with natural parents. this is what genetic theories of kin-
selection would predict. martin Daly and margo Wilson, Homicide, Aldine de gruyter, 1988.
     31. While the possibility of adaptive determinacy may be a useful methodological starting point, pan-
adaptationism would be intolerable as a conclusion if unchastened by the efforts at falsification that Popper 
recommended. the more circumspect evolutionists have warned against attributing adaptation as a cause 
without adequate demonstration. Cf. george Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection, Princeton, 1966.
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confirming the adaptive preconditions for autonomy. to the extent that plasticity itself 
becomes adaptive, one would expect for human nature at least a mix of instinctive ad-
aptations and found adaptations perpetuated by culture. Whether certain behaviors are 
instinctive or not may be determinable by various experiments (e.g., the ease with which 
certain logical problems are solvable if associated with cheating).32 in such cases the 
adaptationist view might explain where instinctive biases might have come from (e.g., 
the adaptive value of cheater-detection). But human plasticity is itself an adaptation that 
resists hardening into a too particular regime of behaviors. 
in sum, the emergence of autonomy predicts—along with sociobiology and evolu-
tionary psychology and against the Blank slate model—that there is some determinacy 
in human nature, at least enough to enable the skills of autonomy. But it denies pan-ad-
aptationism for both theoretical and ethical reasons. Pan-adaptationism is theoretically 
inadequate insofar as it fails to see how indeterminacy can be adaptive. it is ethically 
pernicious insofar as it minimizes the human potential for autonomy in the name of 
instincts for survival.
5. Beyond the False Dichotomies
the influence of the Age of newton on Darwinism—with its reductive conception 
of scientific explanation—bequeathed several metaphysical errors that have obscured 
the biological foundations of evolutionary ethics:
if evolution has no •	 telos, there is no final causation beyond human purposes
scientific explanation must reduce causal explanation to the lowest level•	
the ultimate causes are the blind laws of force•	
Competitive selection drives evolutionary progress•	
Human nature is fixed by selection for adaptive behaviors•	
newtonian atomism prompted a reaction by holistic theories of evolution result-
ing in a legacy of false explanatory dichotomies: simplicity vs. complexity, atomism vs. 
holism, individualism vs. society, competition vs. cooperation, and determinacy vs. free-
dom. the choices are false because in complex systems these terms are not alternatives 
but are parameters in evolution’s opportunistic diversification into whatever forms can 
survive. Happily, the science of complexity yields an ontology of freedom that escapes 
such oversimplifications.33
on the other hand, the burdens of the newtonian-Humean legacy are not only 
ontological, but normative as well, including modern moral philosophy’s “separation of 
fact and value” and its “naturalistic fallacy.” Just as the teleonomic view of life must trans-
form our concept of final causation, so the teleonomic view of evolution must change 
our view of how human interests and obligations are implied by evolutionary facts. 
     32. Barkow, Cosmides, and tooby, The Adapted Mind, oxford, 1992.
     33. see the work of stanley salthe on the basic ontology of complex systems as products of evolution; esp. 
Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change in Biology. Cambridge: mit, 1993; and Evolving Hierarchical 
Systems: Their Structure and Representation. ny: Columbia, 1985.
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E. tHE Evolution oF FREEDom: FRom EtHiCs to PolitiCs
When Darwinism put the theological interpretation of human nature in doubt, some 
philosophers and scientists sought to find ethical implications in (what then seemed to 
be) the progressive thrust of evolution. But such attempts to wrest values from facts ran 
up against a view—descending from Hume’s metaphysics (via positivism) and moore’s 
ethics34 —that blocked direct implication from facts to values. the prestige of moral 
anti-naturalism led many 20th century philosophers to discount evolutionary ethics in 
principle. But these critiques do not touch an evolutionary ethics based on human na-
ture’s most adaptive trait, autonomy.
1. Facts vs. Values (Hume)
Hume’s famous separation of is and ought was an assumption of many philosophers 
and scientists throughout the 20th century. Hume’s view followed from his newtonian 
explanation of morality in terms of the force of passions. Faced with the diversity of 
moral cultures, it seems logical to acknowledge the extent to which socialization shapes 
morality according to the accidents of history. likewise, if culture authorizes the social 
habits we call morality, morality is no longer natural but conventional. Hume’s emphasis 
on local norms dealt an epochal blow to the natural law view of morality and began the 
drift toward moral relativism that has recently found a home in postmodern political 
thought. 
Hume’s challenge to ethical naturalism amounts to two claims: first, that morality 
is constituted by social conventions rather than by natural law; and second, that moral 
arguments cannot deduce moral implications from facts. As it turns out, these are quite 
different issues, and neither is as all-encompassing as is often supposed.
Hume’s critique of natural law moralities depends on a distinction between natural 
laws and human laws. As Hume rightly points out, natural laws are physically necessary, 
in which case they cannot be broken. By contrast, we need prisons precisely because 
civic laws can and will be broken. if natural laws describe events that are necessary, 
and if human laws aim to control events that are voluntary, then we misrepresent the 
authority of morality by referring to it as natural law. instead, Hume argues, we should 
recognize that it is society that creates morality and that socializes its members into an 
acceptance of those standards. 
Furthermore, Hume anticipates moore by questioning moral predicates. When we 
call something right or wrong, do we refer our moral predicates to a property in the 
natural world? Hume says no; anticipating the moral emotivists, he says that moral 
predicates merely express our own (subjective) reaction to (objective) properties in the 
world. to make his point Hume contrasts our use of the terms “parricide” and “wrong.” 
the referent of parricide (parent killer) may be in the world, but the referent of the 
moral term (wrongness) is not. note that the offspring of people and trees sometimes kill 
their parents. Both examples of parricide refer to events in the world. But we distinguish 
     34. Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903.
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people and trees when we apply the predicate “wrong”: we only apply it to people. to 
Hume this shows that wrongness depends on our reaction to the deed, not to the nature 
of the deed, which is the same in both cases.
For Hume, there is a categorical gulf between facts and values, a gap that prevents 
moralists from deducing an ought-claim from an is-claim. in his short but influential 
remarks at the end of his Treatise, Hume notes that many people blithely pass from state-
ments about facts to statements about values. But is does not imply ought. it may be a 
fact that sprouts are vitamin rich, but that does not imply that we should eat sprouts. 
We may get what sprouts have to offer from other vegetables. Rock-climbing may be 
dangerous, but that does not mean that we should not rock-climb. one may be a very 
safe and talented rock-climber who is uniquely fulfilled by rock-climbing, or one may 
have to climb rocks to save passengers of a crashed airline. in short, we cannot deduce 
that we ought to do or not do x from the truth that x is a good or bad.
Despite Hume’s enormous influence, when taken separately each point proves to 
be less radical than his descendants would have us believe. in particular, neither point 
denies the ethical implications (properly drawn) of autonomy as the telos of human evo-
lution.
Hume’s reduction of morality to socialized feelings depends on his adoption of new-
ton’s anti-teleological premises. given those assumptions, it is not surprising that Hume 
finds human desires to be as irrational as physical forces as both are the blind movers 
of the world machine. if one views passions in isolation, as if they were distinct forces, it 
may very well appear that they are as contingent and unnatural as social conventions. 
But morality has a function—social harmonization—that even Hume understood is 
not entirely contingent. indeed, Hume conceded that something like natural law actu-
ally does exist in the principles of justice. though Hume denied that moralities are con-
sistent across societies, he acknowledged that societies all seek to harmonize individual 
actions (thus granting a teleological dimension to morality) and that on the most general 
level, the foundational principles of justice (defense of property, prohibition of murder, 
prohibition of fraud) are have the same general aim, though not in detail. thus the ten-
dency of all societies to seek harmony by way of laws against theft and fraud resembles 
a natural law. But if this is the case, then the irrationalism that Hume imputes to the 
passions is denied to the extent that socialized passions aim at the most harmonious 
social order possible. 
the covert teleology of Hume’s sociological model undercuts his denial that moral 
predicates pick out objective properties. if conventions of morality and justice are the 
natural means for achieving collective welfare, then moral attributions may refer to ob-
jective efficiencies and inefficiencies in the social system of harmonization. in that case, 
moral predicates do not just express feelings we have, but refer to objective properties 
of the social system (which is not to say the references are true). Regarding the social 
functional content of moral claims, the newtonian view gets the direction of explana-
tion backwards. Parricide is not wrong because we feel it is wrong; rather, we feel par-
ricide is wrong (whether by nature or nurture) because it violates primal social bonds. in 
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evolutionary terms, antipathy to parricide reflects its unadaptive effects for the human 
community, one of our adaptive enablers.35 When the telos of social harmony is taken 
into account, moral passions are not merely contingent, blind, irrational, and subjective 
but are more or less rational and objectively sociable according to their contribution to 
the health of society. 
But just as Hume’s metaphysics led him to underestimate the rationality and natural-
ness of passions, so Hume’s descendants perpetuate subjectivist readings of evolutionary 
ethics. this is especially ironic insofar as adaptive explanations only make sense on the 
basis of objectively real social dynamics. As michael Ruse explains, if altruistic behav-
ior makes societies more adaptive, humans might “be programmed to think in certain 
broad patterns of cooperation, where this preprogramming would not be sufficiently 
stringent as to restrict their actions completely [as in insect altruism] in any particular 
situation…[Rather, evolution has] filled us full of thoughts about the need to cooper-
ate…[i.e.,] beliefs about obligations to help” (1993, 147).36 so what is the status of those 
beliefs? Rather than seeing that ethics, if it tracks adaptive conditions for well-being and 
survival, has a foundation in objective goods, skeptical materialists still cannot liberate 
morality from Hume’s subjective prison of mere thoughts. sociobiology does not tear 
down the walls of Hume’s prison; it merely explains why we normally don’t see the walls: 
“even though morality may not be objective, in the sense of referring to something ‘out 
there,’ it is an important part of the experience of morality that we think it is. its phe-
nomenology, if you like, is that we believe it to be objective.”37 
surely this sort of explanation tries too hard to preserve moral subjectivism in the 
face of contrary evidence. Families have interests as a group; cooperation serves those 
interests; animals evolved motivations to serve the interest of the group; morality is 
the human system of thoughts that enshrines our group interests. moral expressions 
refer (truly or falsely) to real aspects of the social world, some of which is natural, some 
of which is constructed. Whether one chooses the group-selection model or the kin-
selection model, the objectivity of group interests pertains: odds of survival, plentiful 
food supply, resistance to predators really determine chances of survival. As natural 
goods they are motives of behavioral altruism. By extension, they are objective grounds 
for human morality as well. of course, there may be some moral motives that refer to 
purely subjective goods (the goods of pleasure, taste, imaginary adventures, etc.) or to 
illusory obligations (duties to slake Baal’s thirst for blood, to obey the king, to believe all 
religious authorities, etc.). But the fact that some of morality’s foundations are specious 
or subjective does not mean that all are. indeed, that is just what the kin selection theory 
of behavioral altruism denies.    
Where newtonian explanation sought causal forces, evolutionary theory explains 
in terms of final effects: if passions are structured to reconcile social harmony and indi-
     35. morality’s implicit reference to social harmony vitiates Hume’s analogy to trees parricide. since trees 
have neither social harmony nor choice, there are no social bonds to be violated.
     36. “the new Evolutionary Ethics,” in nitecki and nitecki..
     37. Op. cit., 153.
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vidual autonomy, they are rational, natural, and objective whether those passions are 
effects of instinct or social arrangements. We may allow Hume that differences between 
moralities must be explained by historical contingencies rather than by nature and that 
some moral claims refer to illusions. But the ideal of harmonized autonomy is natural 
and objective, which allows philosophy some critical leverage on the historical contin-
gencies of morality and justice.
once the prospective nature of evolutionary ethics is recognized, Hume’s concerns 
about not deducing duties from facts are beside that point. indeed, it is less misleading to 
call Hume’s view anti-deductivism than anti-naturalism. Hume’s real target was not Aristo-
tle’s naturalism—which takes a prudential and probabilistic approach to practical rea-
son -- but rather the quasi-scholastic practice in his time of deducing ethical injunctions 
from facts about what is good. unlike scholastic arguments about morality, prudential 
theories of practical reason care less about rules and more about estimating probabilities 
of success and weights of competing goods and evils. 
2. Good as a Natural Property (Moore)
After Hume, g. E. moore’s critique of “the naturalistic fallacy” has been the great-
est obstacle to an evolutionary ethics. indeed, moore’s critique was partly inspired by 
Darwinian arguments that nature defined good as fitness. Beyond social Darwinism, 
moore generalized his critique to disallow the identification of goodness with any natu-
ral property. in the spirit of ordinary language philosophy, moore noted that “good” is 
not like other predicates insofar as it cannot be reduced to natural properties. 
moore defended this view by his use of what has been called the open Question 
Argument. He began with the observation that we often refer to certain natural proper-
ties as being good. this would seem to follow the traditional view that there are certain 
natural goods such as pleasure and health that might prompt us to say “the music was 
good because it was pleasurable” or “my holiday was good because i was able to get 
some rest.” But moore noted that as obvious as these explanations seem, it is always pos-
sible to ask: “But was it good that the music was pleasurable?” or “But was it good that 
you were able to get some rest?” With a little imagination, it is conceivable that we might 
answer these questions in the negative. For instance, it is possible that someone who is 
overworked might be better off completing what was started than stopping to rest. in 
that case, rest might be a short-sighted good. or some disabilities might actually require 
exertion for recovery rather than rest. For moore, however, the fact that the question is 
always open means that goodness cannot be identified with any particular natural prop-
erties. to do so commits “the naturalistic fallacy.”
one can draw several conclusions from this unique feature of the predicate “good.” 
Echoing Hume, moral emotivists concluded that moral predicates only expresses our 
feelings about whatever such predicates refer to. moore took a more Platonic route, 
concluding that though people do have an idea of goodness, it is not a natural property 
of things. Rather, it is a pure intuition, which means that goodness is indefinable. 
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moore’s argument gets some traction against theories that would simply identify 
goodness to certain natural properties, but subtler moral naturalisms can avoid such 
oversimplifications. the naturalism of Aristotle, for instance, avoids the reduction in 
question by distinguishing goods as healthy end-states and goodness as a property of things. 
there are natural or intrinsic goods (health, learning, fellowship, etc.), which are the 
(teleonomic) goals of various natural urges or desires. this naturalism is consistent with 
moore’s use of the “method of isolation” to discover intrinsic goods: asking whether life 
would be worse off without some good. in general life would be worse off (less healthy) 
without natural goods. But the existence of natural goods does not imply that the predi-
cate goodness can be identified with a natural property. 
like Hume’s anti-naturalism, moore’s gets little traction against a prudential natu-
ralism. the “all things being equal” character of natural goods does not imply that, 
while normally good, their achievement is good in every instance. to the contrary, Ar-
istotelian prudence insists that realizing goods in practice is an art (of estimation) rather 
than a science (of necessity), involving complex relations between means and ends. We 
may have to choose which good to aim at, or between competing goods, or between 
competing means of achieving the aimed-at-good. Even if aimed-at-goods are good in 
principle, prudence distinguishes the right good for the moment and the right means 
according to circumstances. though ethics begins with the facts of natural goods, ethical 
judgment goes beyond the science of goods to the art of prudently adjusting local means 
to ultimate ends. 
to return to the linguistic idiom, it matters whether good is a noun or an adjective. if 
it refers to natural goods, then it behaves like all other facts: there are, in general, certain 
natural goods. the use of the adjective is where generalizations fail and where moore’s 
open Question Argument shows its teeth: while there are natural goods, it is not always 
good to seek them and they may sometimes be mixed with prohibitive penalties and 
costs. moore’s open Question Argument identifies a real fallacy that would occur if 
someone were to confuse the nominal and adjectival senses of goodness. As long as one 
is merely referring to the facts of natural goods, however, the fallacy does not arise. 
While moore’s intention may have been to wrest goodness from the jaws of social 
Darwinism, his insight clarifies the complexity of autonomy as a natural good, thereby 
restoring the prospects for an evolutionary ethics. unlike personal traits such as clever-
ness, beauty, or wit, autonomy is a more generally adaptive trait that bears an open-
ended relationship to our more particular traits. like prudence, which presides over the 
other virtues, autonomy implies the ability to use other traits for ultimate ends. We are 
prudent to the degree to which can answer moore’s open Question Argument with the 
best possible answer from imagined alternatives. We are autonomous to the extent that 
we can imagine preferable alternatives to the prima facie goods moore would expose 
as superficial.
the telos of autonomy avoids the subjectivity of moore’s intuitionism while benefiting 
from his critique of reductive naturalism. the naturalistic fallacy can be set aside merely 
by allowing (a) that certain things are natural goods but also (b) that arranging them 
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properly requires prudent judgment. this at once allows that there are natural goods, 
that freedom is one of them, and that freedom complicates the problem of choosing 
the right means at the right time. the fact that ethical choices are not predetermined 
does not imply there is something transcendent about the good (one might as well call 
it immanent). Rather, it means that while typical states of satisfaction are natural goods, 
what is good at this point in time is so by virtue of its relationship to the best possible 
good. moore was right that goodness is not a natural property. But that is because it is 
a relationship between natural properties. the property of goodness is not so much tran-
scendent as complex.
3. Principles vs. Ends (Kant)
in responding to Hume, Kant answered one moral anti-naturalism with another. 
it was Hume’s reduction of morality to social conventions that prompted Kant to for-
malize the logic of moral choice. His answer was twofold. First, he tried to restore the 
deductive necessity to morality that Hume properly laid to rest. not content to live with 
probabilistic moral inferences, Kant sought categorical necessities, duties that would be 
exceptionless: required at all times, in all places, for everyone. Categorical obligation, 
Kant hoped, would eliminate problems of prudential judgment and specious rationali-
zation (not only for the common folk, but for religious casuistry as well). unfortunately, 
Kant’s theories of Pure Reason and Pure Practical Reason depended on assumptions 
about the apriori intelligibility of nature that have been discredited by modern science 
and epistemology. But where Kant failed as a moralist he succeeded as a social theo-
rist. His attempt to discover universal moral duties led him to anticipate what an ideal 
of autonomy would require of a legal system, thereby providing the prototype for how 
the ideal of autonomy should constrain democratic polities. this unwitting success is 
marked by two significant ironies.
First, the very weakness of Kant’s conception of morality—its legalism—suits it for 
a political philosophy of autonomy. Kant hoped to discover the rule that would always 
determine whether an action is moral or not. But if ethics does not reduce to rules, the 
task of designing the most just society does reduce to rules. in fact, that is the point: to 
find the most basic laws of the just society. 
the second irony of Kant’s project is that, while trying to imagine a moral theory 
that was formal and categorical rather than teleological, he conceived of the condi-
tions of the society whose telos is universal autonomy. Kant recognized that if individual 
autonomy were the ideal of a moral system, everyone would be (1) equally obligated as 
fully autonomous moral actors and equally free to exercise their moral judgment, and 
(2) that everyone would be obligated to respect in others the same basic rights they claim 
for themselves. of course, people do not have an equal capacity for autonomy, but they 
need not for Kant’s model to have traction. the point is not that everyone is already au-
tonomous, but rather that—given our biological inheritance—no one can be justly counted 
out from the start. the only way to discover how autonomous people can be is to empower 
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them to be autonomous, or at least allow them to be. 
Where some social theories begin with the pessimist assumption about human po-
tential for morality, Kant reasoned that morality requires that we begin from the other 
end, the telos of the free society. For a society that presumes to be free, the premise of 
equal moral autonomy is a necessary presupposition given that we do not know in ad-
vance that anyone is incapable of moral autonomy (of course, proven criminals may have 
counted themselves out for having violated the rights of others). the fundamental rule 
of the ideally autonomous society is that everyone treats others as “ends-in-themselves” 
and not only as a means to her own ends. translated into laws, that ideal becomes a pro-
hibition against institutions that enable some to exploit others; such institutions would 
block the potential autonomy of the exploited citizens. 
though Kant understood the truth of his theory as a formal truth rather than an 
empirical truth, his model fits an evolutionary ethics of autonomy perfectly. if the end of 
human evolution is the moral autonomy of all, then that end cannot favor the freedom 
of some at the expense of others, and the just society must be founded on the prohibi-
tion against domination and exploitation. the consequence of such prohibitions would 
be (a) to allow freedom to develop one’s autonomy, and (b) to allow as much freedom 
for individuals as is consistent with the same freedom for others (free speech, freedom 
of religion, freedom of lifestyle, etc.). in short, the opportunity for universal autonomy 
is the first principle of the legal order and its preservation is the first responsibility of the 
state.
Despite his faulty theories of mind and morality, Kant solved the political problem 
of autonomy after newton, not by discovering the form of the ideally moral individual, 
but by prohibiting the institutional obstacles to universal freedom. some may object to 
the generality of his scheme and the vagueness of the prohibition against domination 
and exploitation, yet that is just why it suits the evolutionary ideal of universal autono-
my. By providing the general or formal standard under which individual freedom can 
best flourish, it allows for the widest possible range of diversity and accommodation of 
circumstances. yet it rules out the institutional injustices that have been legitimated by 
ideologies of class domination.
4. Postmodern Anti-Teleology
Despite their differences, Hume, Kant, and moore contributed to a generalized 
discrediting of natural foundations for ethics and justice. in the 20th century, liberal po-
litical and legal theorists chose the Kantian alternative to natural foundations by seeking 
formal procedures for “fair” resolutions of conflicts of interest. But as Habermas’ and 
Rawls’ careers show, without the authority of natural grounds, such appeals to reason-
able procedures may only pit their subjective preferences for fairness against subjective 
preferences for traditional authority, rights of contract, rights of labor, etc. in the face of 
alternative foundational principles—say, those of traditional religions—liberal appeals 
to fairness lack a non-question-begging argument for why fairness trumps all other prin-
Cosmos AnD HistoRy88
ciples. By contrast, appeals to human nature have at least an objective and species-wide 
foundation in shared interests and biological facts.38 
though increasingly popular around the world, liberal political philosophy has suf-
fered defections from within its Western ranks in the form of postmodern attacks on 
objectivity, universality, foundationalism, essentialism, and meta-narratives of progress. 
the postmodern attack on foundationalism resulted from the failure of positivism and 
other foundational projects to discover an ultimate form, method, or criterion of sci-
ence. this failure led thinkers such as Richard Rorty to reject the ideal of objective 
foundations for philosophy and politics.39 the attack on essentialism follows from the 
failure of foundational methodology: if there is no privileged method of discovering 
human nature, then one cannot objectively pick out an essence of human nature. lack-
ing an objective essence, human nature dissolves among differences in epistemic, met-
aphysical, and methodological assumptions (e.g., eternal souls vs. utility-maximizing 
consumers vs. existentialist self-inventors, etc.). Here human plasticity is turned against 
the naturalization of ethical goals. insofar as human ends and priorities have proven 
historically relative, the human telos must be defined historically rather than naturally. 
Just as continuous evolutionary change rules out the essentialism of fixed species, so the 
historical character of human nature discredits moral teleology. the postmodern rejec-
tion of “meta-narratives” of progress echoes Darwinism’s subversion of cosmic teleology 
with multiple trends. Just as nature is indifferent to its outcomes, so is History indifferent 
to its ultimate human forms. Against the Hegelian tendency to read history as reason’s 
progress, postmoderns conclude that the loss of essentialism (whether natural or ration-
al) entails the loss of any ultimate criterion of historical progress, biological or rational.
unlike some Darwinian skeptics, postmodern anti-universalists generally presup-
pose human freedom at the expense of biological determinism. they take the plasticity 
and diversity of human nature as evidence that there is no human nature to explain or 
idealize. moreover, past sexist, racist, and colonial uses of theories of human nature leads 
these skeptics to suspect utopian theories that would define human welfare for everyone 
rather than leaving it up to individuals to define in their own best interests. ideologies 
of collective interests have too often, they charge, been rationalizations for domination 
by those ideologically privileged: the general good becomes an excuse for subordinating 
the many to the theories of the architects of justice. thus in Athens (according to Aris-
totle) the general good needed the moral leadership of a class of aristocrats and a class 
of slaves upon which their leisure depended. in the 19th century (according to social 
Darwinians) human progress required that the rich flourish unchecked and the poor be 
left to their just deserts. All such ideological fabrications, the postmoderns charge, be-
tray the sort of radically individual freedom that would allow individuals to discover and 
     38. the teleology of autonomy cannot, of course, answer either radical skeptics or religious dogmatists. 
But then no one else can either. the ideal of autonomy has the strengths and limitation of natural facts.
     39. The Consequences of  Pragmatism, minneapolis, minnesota, 1982; Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
Cambridge, 1989.
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define their own ideal selves and forge their own moral and political alliances (hence, 
political localism).
notwithstanding the disillusioned tone of postmodern politics, there is an irony in 
its claims to be pragmatic and realistic about ideological power: its fear of essentialism 
deprives its notion of freedom of any biological or political substance. Postmodern free-
dom lacks substance insofar as it brackets the social prerequisites of freedom for fear of 
collective impositions. But just as evolution must provide the biological preconditions of 
individual autonomy, so must society provide the enabling conditions of individual au-
tonomy. Just as there is no meaningful notion of biological autonomy apart from a mind 
that can imagine alternative futures, so there is no meaningful freedom apart from the 
social conditions that prohibit domination and exploitation. Kant was right: utopia may 
not have a blueprint, but it has universal, moral constraints against those who would 
sacrifice the self-development of others for their own. But to postmoderns, that sounds 
like collective impositions.
the short-sightedness of postmodern views of self-invention render them curiously 
coincident with the view of free market libertarians—the contemporary descendants 
of social Darwinism—whose strong claims about property rights and free markets are 
deeply anti-egalitarian. Postmodern skeptics may doubt the universality of epistemic 
and normative foundations while libertarians speak confidently about the universality 
of property rights and market justice, but both positions reject the naturalization of indi-
vidual goods by claiming that interpersonal comparisons of utility/goodness are impos-
sible so that no one is in a position to represent the collective welfare of society as whole. 
likewise, both postmoderns and libertarians dismiss the marxian caveat about “false 
consciousness,” the postmoderns because that concept presumes an objective standard 
of truth and libertarians because it is the individual’s responsibility (not society’s) to have 
good information. Radical individualists—whether libertarian or postmodern—define 
freedom primarily in relation to physical constraints (i.e., natural selection, the state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, etc.) because these limitations on individual 
freedom are too obvious to be ignored and are always local in application. these coin-
cidences have interesting political consequences.
too focused on immediate physical constraints, and too wary of institutional au-
thority, radical individualists too often ignore the systemic structures of power that con-
trol macro-evolutionary trends in biology and distributions of property in society. on 
the one hand, economic individualism collapses market behavior backwards into strug-
gles for survival in nature, thereby naturalizing economic competition (oblivious to its 
institutional substance), thereby identifying economic success with justice. on the other 
hand, postmoderns abstract individual choice out of both nature and society, accepting 
the freedom of self-invention at face value. in both cases, the mere exercise of choice 
becomes a sufficient condition for freedom without attention to the systemic constraints 
on choice.40 in both cases, the attempt to heighten the reality of individual action at the 
     40.  As a number of critics have pointed out, Foucault was inconsistent on this point. in his early works 
Foucault proved remarkably sensitive to the ways in which social concepts and practices structure thinking 
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expense of collective constraints merely obscures the collective constraints that are as 
influential in economic life as they are in evolution. indeed, individuals are far more 
subject to invisible hands in society than in nature. thought the invisible hand in evolu-
tion determines that predator and prey depend on each other (to prevent overgrazing), 
the lion still does her own hunting. But the invisible hand of market dynamics makes 
and breaks fortunes with cavalier disregard for whether stock owners have earned their 
property or not. 
Radical individualism—whether in biology, economics or politics—tends for ideo-
logical reasons to obscure or ignore institutional constraints and resources, the invisible 
hands that limit some actions while actively empowering others.41 this pragmatic con-
vergence of economic individualism and postmodern individualism might be surprising 
given their different metaphysics: the former’s reduction of human virtue to a competi-
tive essence and the latter’s denial of any human essence at all. But what explains their 
pragmatic convergence is the fact that both are forms of selectionism which, though differ-
ent in form, are similar in their effects. Because both are willing for freedom to reduce 
to individual choices—regardless of their social conditions and collective effects—they 
both eschew the sort of systemic, collective constraints on individuals that preserve the 
widest possible opportunity for self-development and equality of opportunity. the result 
is that while libertarians and postmodern skeptics are suspicious of physical coercion, 
both are tolerant of vast inequalities of economic power, libertarians because they do 
not believe that free markets can be unjust, and postmoderns because they have no ob-
jective standard of justice by which to critique economic injustice. (Postmoderns do not 
usually admit to tolerating vast inequality but it follows from their ethical relativism.) 
By contrast, a more adequate account of human nature gives collective interests and 
social dynamics their due, specifying both the psychological and the social precondi-
tions that allow the emergence of autonomy. to the extent that the ideal of individual 
freedom is the attractor for human development, the free society is thereby naturalized, 
not as something already inherited from nature (as economic individualists argue) or as 
something that can be bracketed or conventionalized to make individual choice radical-
ly free (as postmodern localism implies). Against both of these truncated views of social 
systems, the evolutionary ideal of autonomy implies that if persons are supposed to be 
free, then society and its members are obliged to find the structures in which freedom is 
optimized for all. the telos of individual autonomy is already biologically visible: it is up 
to social theorists to determine the form that best realizes that ideal. 
F. FREEDom nAtuRAlizED
the definitive influence of physics on modern science and the peculiarities of the 
below the level of conscious choice. But in his later work he appeared to reduce freedom to individual self-
invention and resisted general theories of power and freedom. Rorty repeatedly rejected deep justifications 
of social ideals, appealing instead to an undertheorized ideal of consensus. 
     41. many postmodern social theorists loudly protest oppressive social conditions. But without a theory of 
collective interests, they have no theoretical or normative leverage.
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telos of freedom explain why problems of causality and the fact/value gap have con-
founded evolutionary ethics from the start. Partisans of determinism and freedom alike 
have tended to misunderstand how the evolution of autonomy exploits a unique history 
of biological innovations to yield the capacity for autonomy. too focused on genetic de-
terminacy, some arguments have promoted an ideal human type, which underestimates 
the significance of diversity. others have underestimated determinism in an effort to 
make room for freedom. others have denied any moral implications from evolution at 
all. 
Against this vexed legacy, the science of complex systems discovers the significance 
of final causation for life in general and for human nature in particular. this restoration 
of finality clarifies the foundation of evolutionary ethics. several key insights stand out:
teleology does not apply to evolution as a whole; rather, teleology emerges •	
through increasing self-organization within organisms.
Adaptive forms are attractors for evolutionary development; evolution is not •	
wholly blind or random, but is constrained by the probabilities of the adap-
tive forms into which organisms may further develop themselves.
the adaptive attractor of human nature has been the development of au-•	
tonomy or self-determination, not a particular character type (whatever may 
have been adaptive in the past). our end is the ability of diverse individuals 
to choose freely the ethically preferable course of action.
social progress does not result from encouraging competitive excellence (as •	
in the ideal of a predatory species), but from the widest possible achievement 
of autonomy.
this reconstruction of final causation reconciles the subjective aspects of ethics with 
its collective and objective conditions. though the subjectivity of ethics undoubtedly in-
troduces conventional and personal contingencies, the adaptive values of autonomy and 
cooperation (esp. culture) are objectively grounded in the material conditions of human 
nature at the genetic, organic, and social levels of interaction.42 
moral and political theorists of the 18th century saw in human nature a natural ideal 
of liberty. But the rise of mechanistic science rendered obscure how freedom could be 
the logical extension of biological determinacy. As our understanding of complex sys-
tems improves, however, we find that the coincidence of our biological inheritance and 
the future of self-invention are part of the same process of emergent autonomy.
Horace l. Fairlamb 
university of Houston-victoria 
fairlambh@uhv.edu
     42. this argument focuses on the political implications of evolution rather than the more specifically ethi-
cal question: is there a natural end toward which autonomous individuals should strive? that question is too 
complex to introduce here. However, the conclusion of this argument—the ideal of autonomy—presumes 
to be the context and starting point for that other issue.
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